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The community of Europe today is at a crossroads. Recent pressures, many of them 
external, are severely testing the integrity of the European Union, as well as the long-
standing regional cooperation. Widespread inconsistencies in national policies across 
member states, especially with regards to economic culture and fiscal policy, have 
presented the EU with an existential crisis.   
My hypothesis is that successful regional integration in Europe, however gradual, was not 
a spontaneous reaction to acute external pressures.  Instead, I argue that successful 
regional integration was the result of a shared vision and careful planning by policy 
makers and negotiators, who never shied away from addressing lofty ideals even as they 
attempted to resolve practical considerations.   
I will select three historical cases that represent foundational moments in the genesis of 
the modern European Union. These three cases are the Treaty of Paris (1951) that forged 
the European Coal and Steel Community, the Treaty of Rome (1957) that established the 
European Economic Community and finally the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) that called 
for the establishment of the European Union.   
I will employ a specific pattern in order to clearly and consistently analyze the cases 
relying on reports, speeches and other documents that demonstrate policy thinking. Each 
case study will focus on the agreement itself and how it addresses, historically and 
theoretically, the shortcomings of the status quo. Finally, each successful case will be 
"tested" according to a number of criteria for successful integration that I encountered in 
the writings of Ernst Haas and Bela Belassa.   




The purpose of this exercise is to attempt to understand how European states were able, 
through the efforts of their leaders, to ultimately sacrifice sovereignty in the name of 
stability. It would be a stretch to suggest that these issues represent the gravest challenges 
that have ever divided Europeans, and that the past has nothing to teach us about 
contemporary conflict resolution. By studying the past, I will discern guidelines for 
formulating policy to maintain the integration movement in Europe.   
  




Chapter 1: Introduction 
The community of Europe today is at a crossroads. For the last several decades, most of 
Europe has been united culturally, economically and to a limited extent, politically, 
through informal relationships and through formal institutions, most notably through the 
European Union.  However, recent pressures, many of them external, are severely testing 
the integrity of the European Union, as well as the long-standing regional cooperation 
that has dominated the continent since the end of the Second World War.  With every 
passing day, globalization is forcing European states to confront new challenges. From 
Scandinavia to Greece, EU members are feeling the effects of military adventures in 
Asia, refugees fleeing conflict in the Arab world and seeking asylum on European shores 
by the millions, and a devastating world-wide financial crisis and  global recession. 
Widespread inconsistencies in national policies across member states, especially with 
regards to economic culture and fiscal policy, have presented the EU with an existential 
crisis.   
Since WWII, European unity, particularly through EU membership, has ensured regional 
cooperation and protected against competition and armed conflict. It was born with just 
six member states in 1951  cooperating in specific industrial arenas.  However, today’s 
EU has swelled in size, counting 28 states in its ranks, and uniting Europe through all 
sorts of common cultural and economic regimes, including commercial, customs and 
monetary policy.  It is impossible to predict if the EU will sacrifice either its own 
principles or its own membership in order to save (or destroy) itself as member states 
attempt to resolve the current crises.  However, from examining the  history of the EU, 
particularly the  previous milestones of successful integration, and then viewing these 




milestones from different perspectives of integration theory, one might be able to distill 
some insight into the principles that inspired Europe’s leaders to consistently choose the 
path of cooperation over competition.  
My hypothesis is that successful regional integration in Europe, however gradual, was not 
a spontaneous reaction to acute external pressures.  Instead, I argue that successful 
regional integration was the result of a shared vision and careful planning by policy 
makers and negotiators, who never shied away from addressing lofty ideals even as they 
attempted to resolve practical considerations.   
In order to support this hypothesis, I will argue that leaders negotiating successful 
integration have demonstrated that they sought to balance long-term idealistic goals 
alongside practical ones. I will select three historical cases that represent foundational 
moments in the genesis of the modern European Union.  These three cases are the Treaty 
of Paris (1951) that forged the European Coal and Steel Community, the Treaty of Rome 
(1957) that established the European Economic Community and finally the Treaty of 
Maastricht (1992) that called for the establishment of the European Union. I select these 
cases because they are characterized as economic agreements, each specifically building 
on the earlier one. They are all progressive agreements in sequence, rendering each 
previous one obsolete through a call for increasingly evolved policies.    Such 
economically based cases are more useful for study than other integration agreements 
(such as political or cultural), since we can trace a clear evolutionary path among related 
agreements.  Because economic agreements incorporate literal dollars and cents (or 
perhaps euros, in our case), an easily identifiable quantitative aspect, the path to 
integration is more easily discerned than in the case of political agreements, whose 




vectors of integration may be more subjective or qualitative, depending on one's 
perspective.   
Each case is a clear example of successful integration.  However, they were also preceded 
by a number of failed or underwhelming attempts at integration or international policy 
coordination in Europe.  As these attempts are contrasted with each test case that takes 
shape as a successful moment of integration, we might discern a consistent pattern of 
behavior and diplomatic strategy that affected the positive outcome.    
It is not enough to analyze these three cases and their political epochs from just an 
historical angle.  A theoretical analysis of the cases, from schools of both international 
relations and integration theory, is necessary. A theoretical analysis is important not only 
because these academic perspectives greatly influenced the fathers of successful 
European integration, but also because they shine a light on where failed attempts at 
integration fell short of their intended marks.  In the successful cases of integration that I 
encounter, policy making will be demonstrated through the use and analysis of speeches, 
reports and other relevant public documents. 
Outline   
I will employ a specific pattern in order to clearly and consistently analyze the cases, 
relying on reports, speeches, and other documents that demonstrate policy thinking.   Part 
one of each case study will begin with an historical and theoretical analysis of the status 
quo preceding each treaty. What was the status of the political environment? What 
regional and global forces were swirling and churning that led policy makers to pursue a 




course of integration? How did previous events fall short, skirt the issue or fail 
completely, ultimately giving birth to the successful treaty? 
The second part of each case study will focus on the successful agreement itself, how it is 
worded, and how it directly addresses, historically and theoretically, the shortcomings of 
the status quo. This section will also delve into the genesis of the agreements, touching 
upon the personalities and political conditions that shaped the accord and maximized the 
probability for a successful outcome, especially in contrast to previous failed attempts.  
Finally, each successful case will be "tested" according to a number of criteria for 
successful integration that I encountered in the writings of Ernst Haas and Bela Belassa.  
These criteria will test for: originality; prescience; responsiveness; perspective; if the 
treaty is forward-thinking; and finally if the treaty accounts for the global picture. Each of 
these tests is "qualitative" in nature, though I have carefully defined each according to 
Haas's own writings. Haas was one of the most prolific theoreticians of integration theory 
in the post-war era, very active from the 1940s to the 1960s. Europe, and is best 
remembered as a champion of the neo-functionalist school of integration theory.  
Additionally, Haas had a front row seat to the process of European integration, observing 
up-close the formation of the proto-EU institutions and an active participant at integration 
conferences following World War II.  Belassa observed and wrote about European 
integration in the 1960s and 70s.  He was most concerned with economic integration, and 
states’ compliance with federal regulations and standards.  Belassa identifies weak spots 
and offers his policy recommendations to increase efficiency and coordination.    
The purpose of this exercise is to attempt to understand how European states were able, 
through the efforts of their leaders, to ultimately sacrifice sovereignty in the name of 




stability. Although the crises over which today's EU member states are squabbling should 
not be minimized in their importance, it would be a stretch to suggest that these issues 
represent the gravest challenges that have ever divided Europeans, and that the past has 
nothing to teach us about contemporary conflict resolution.   
Methodology   
Primary sources will play a key role in helping to frame the agreements, and include the 
clues we need to sift out the impact of visionary leaders behind the scenes at the 
negotiations. They fall mainly into two groups. The first consists the actual treaties 
signed by members of the modern European Union. This will consist of the three main 
treaties that headline each case study, as well as any relevant auxiliary agreements and 
amendments. The second set of primary sources are those relevant writings that impacted 
the negotiations and final agreements, penned by those visionary leaders and capable 
diplomats. In each case, there is always a manifesto, public address or key position paper 
that strongly influenced the final agreement. Each of these papers expresses an inspired 
vision for a final agreement, written by a European national leader with a front row seat 
to the negotiations, and representing a constituency with a large stake in a final 
agreement. 
With respect to the first case, Treaty of Paris (1951) establishing the European Coal and 
Steel Community, of chief interest is the Schumann Declaration of 1950, a paper blessed 
by the leaders of France and Germany spelling out a vision for a realistic and sustainable 
union of major regional powers. In the second case, Treaty of Rome (1957), the visionary 
foundation was laid in the Spaak Report of 1956, produced by an intergovernmental 
committee exploring the possibility of further economic integration for European states. 




In exploring the inspiration for the final case study, Treaty of Maastricht (1992) 
establishing the European Union, I’ll examine the efforts and leadership of Jacques 
Delors, whose commissions mapped out a political groundwork for lasting economic 
federalism in Europe. 
Secondary sources fall mainly into two categories, both which will provide a framework 
of analysis for the primary sources and the cases. The first type of secondary source 
refers to the political and economic theorists writing, mainly but not exclusively, as 
firsthand witnesses to the phenomenon of modern European integration. Hailing mainly 
from the Liberalist school, they provide the academic basis for how and when to identify 
integration in international and regional systems, as well as the relevant definitions, 
factors and impacts. Without these sources, it would be impossible to identify integration 
phenomena. Major integration theorists such as Haas, Belassa, Cantori, Spiegel, in 
addition to a number of other writers observe modern political history in Europe and 
around the world, and comment on the forces and phenomena that impact political 
systems, as nations' interest either align or diverge.  
The second type of secondary sources includes those historians and journalists who 
observed and researched the actual negotiations, correspondence and personalities that 
affected European integration in each case. They provide historical context in which to 
place the primary sources Without their input, there would be no frame of reference for 
determining the forces and criteria that underlie the success of each case.     
Further sources that do not fall within these strict categories include additional theorists 
not writing specifically with regards to European integration, but perhaps in reference to 
other broad relevant concepts, such as Liberalism, political psychology, types of 




integration and international cooperation, and economics. Similarly, we may encounter 
some additional sources that further contextualize the phenomenon of European 
integration without referring specifically to the European experience. By incorporating 
these auxiliary sources, we will have a better idea of what the past can tell us about 
successful integration in Europe, and draw conclusions about what such cooperation 
means for the future of the region and the global community. 
  




Chapter 2: Review of Literature 
In light of my topic, a basic source that helps bridge historical and theoretical context for 
the evolution of the modern EU is The Community of Europe by Derek W. Urwin.  
Urwin’s book is subtitled “a history of European integration since 1945,” and, as such, 
places special emphasis on the people and events that shaped the modern EU. Since it 
encompasses both intergovernmental and sovereign institutions, the EU is a product of 
decades of diplomacy executed and relationships preserved at the highest level. Urwin 
focuses on these diplomats and policy makers, as well as their political environments, in 
order to draw a trajectory of integration from the end of WWII to the present day. In a 
sense, Urwin’s book utilizes an historical perspective to demonstrate theoretical 
integration.1   
As a complement to Urwin’s history is Europe in Question, by R.J. Harrison. While 
Urwin details the specific circumstances of Europe’s path to unification, Harrison is 
consumed by the theoretical questions that underlie the local integration movement, and 
how these paradigmatic considerations should affect policy making. Harrison lays out the 
different major integration theories that influenced the EU’s founding fathers, namely the 
theories of Functionalism, Neo-functionalism and Federalism, and their specific roles as 
players in the drama of European unification. At every step of unification, and throughout 
my three cases, policy makers were not simply acting impulsively or in response to 
immediate circumstances. They were all heavily steeped in both ideology and many years 
of integration theory. Harrison focuses on this aspect, and is interested in actually 
                                                           
1 Derek W. Urwin, The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration Since 1945 (New York: 
Longman, 1995).    




advising national policy with respect to integration by studying the influences of these 
theories.2   
My hypothesis is supported directly by a foundation of primary sources applicable to 
each case. The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European 
Integration is a reader compiled and edited by Brent F. Nelson and Alexander Stubb 
that contains several helpful documents and academic papers.  
Nelson & Stubb is the source of the text for the Schumann Declaration, a brief address 
delivered in 1950 by French foreign minister Robert Schumann and heavily influenced 
by Schumann’s advisor, Jean Monnet. The declaration is often seen as the metaphorical 
olive branch accepted by the Germans from the French, triggering the process of 
negotiation that led to organic integration among major European powers. The speech 
lays out a foundation for France and Germany that addressed immediate practical 
concerns while encouraging fundamental alignment of interests in the future. The 
Schumann proposal, paired with the auspicious political conditions in the international 
community, is in many ways the “Big Bang” moment for the politically and economically 
united Europe that we know today. 3  
As the Schumann Declaration is regarded as a critical point in European political history, 
Jean Monnet is famous for being the main thinker behind Schumann’s statement, and 
Nelson and Stubb even refer to him as the “father of Europe.”  If the structures of the 
                                                           
2 R.J. Harrison, Europe in Question (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1974). 
3 Robert Schumann, “ The Schumann Declaration,” in The European Union: Readings on the Theory and 
Practice of European Integration, ed. Brent F. Nelson and Alexander Stubb (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne 
Rienner, 2003). 
 




European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) underlie the modern European Union, and 
the ECSC originated with the Schumann Declaration, and Monnet’s own vision birthed 
the Schumann Declaration, then Monnet, indeed, deserves quite a bit of credit for the 
successful unification that took hold in Europe over the decades. Nelson and Stubb 
include a 1962 essay called A Ferment of Change in which Jean Monnet, near the end 
of his life, reflects on the new regional institution that had since evolved into the 
European Economic Community. Monnet gives his own perspective, an authorized 
biography of sorts, on the challenges that are facing a free Europe and the way that 
nations are banding together to meet them.  As a good Functionalist, Monnet concludes 
with a brief vision of the future of European integration, and the movement’s own 
purpose within the grand scheme of civilization.4 
Ernst Haas, in my research, appeared as one of the most prolific and influential 
Neofunctionalist writers.   His 1958 essay The Challenge of Regionalism was one of the 
first I encountered. It thoroughly elucidates different political systems and challenges that 
arise when states encounter each o 
very aspect of integration, from political machinery to the economy to civil society.  
What sort of issues bring states together in a regional system, and how is the system 
changed by effective integration? How should ruling elites behave to retain the support of 
their constituents and win over outsiders? What is the role of transnational interest 
groups?  What does a most stable society look like after integration? What might imperil 
it?  By providing a complete vision of what a united Europe both looks like and does not, 
                                                           
4 Jean Monnet, “ A Ferment of Change,” in The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of 
European Integration, ed. Brent F. Nelson and Alexander Stubb (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2003). 




Haas’s essay provides a useful pamphlet for policy makers to reference as they strike a 
deal on unification.  In fact, a number of criteria for my “test” of a successful integration 
treaty are derived from this essay.5  
While Haas wrote several very well-known papers on integration theory, a second essay 
of his, International Integration: The European and Universal Process, from 1961, 
also proved extremely useful in informing about the history and political expediency of 
early European unification. While The Challenge of Regionalism, described above, 
referred to Haas’s ideas of general integration “do’s and don’ts,” European and 
Universal Integration (as it is sometimes known) looks back on the European Economic 
Community and directly compares the European experience of integration with other 
existing intergovernmental unions. Haas examines the institutions and methods of these 
other organizations in comparison to the EEC, and determines the way that the 
organizations differ from each other, generally falling short in efficacy and scope. Haas 
actually derives what he calls “lessons” from his research that ultimately serve to 
distinguish, on paper, the EEC from other international organizations.  Finally, and 
maybe most interestingly, Haas attempts to apply his lessons of European unification to 
other parts of the globe, such as the Americas, Asia and the Soviet Union, in order to 
predict the trajectories of their respective regional systems.6  
                                                           
5 Ernst B Haas, "The Challenge of Regionalism." International Organization 12.4 (1958): 440-58. JSTOR. 
Web. 28 Sept. 2012. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/2704567?ref=search-
gateway:9163c649966c85f8f0ee14ad44d27c94>. 
6 Ernst B Haas, "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process." International 
Organization 15.3 (1961): 366-92. JSTOR. Web. 28 Sept. 2012. 
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/2705338?ref=search-
gateway:ec65e6f79ed32c51cb1e88a1869fdf80>. 




Although I encountered a number of economic and political theorists in my research, 
another personality that stood out among the others was Bela Belassa.  Belassa observes 
the economic machinery of the European Economic Community in the 1960s and 1970s, 
and derives his own ideas and theories about the problems and purposes of regional 
integration.  In 1973, Belassa wrote Regional Policies and the Environment in the 
European Common Market.  By “environment” here, Belassa refers to the economic 
conditions both within each member state and also across the regional union. He observes 
how member states fail to live up to their commitments of respecting regional economic 
policy, and examines how these policies affect domestic populations and prices, as well 
as their impact abroad.  Belassa goes on to critique existing regional institutions, praising 
them where he sees merit and mentioning where they fall short. Finally, he recommends 
measures to strengthen the common market, through better policies at the federal level 
and promoting compliance and responsibility to good governance among member states.7   
The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond by Walter Mattli is another 
text that maps a theoretical approach to integration, using modern European history as a 
backdrop.  Mattli writes about the specific impact of integration theories on the European 
continent, but paying special attention to the economic considerations of the evolution of 
the EU.  After extensively covering European integration, Mattli applies theories of 
integration to other regional organizations in different geographic and historical settings.8  
                                                           
7 Bela Belassa, "Regional Policies and the Environment in the European Common Market," 
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv Bd. 109 (1973): 402-17. JSTOR. Web. 17 Oct. 2012. 
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/40437694?ref=search-
gateway:fa73d9c83f565168bf6ec7276c335e3e>. 
8 Walter Mattli, The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond (New York: Cambridge, 1999). 




France and Germany at Maastricht: Politics and Negotiations to Create the European 
Union by Colette Mazucelli is a detailed account of what went on behind the scenes 
between Europe’s two most important powers on the eve of the formation of the 
European Union in 1992.  In 1950, Schumann stated loud and clear the objectives, ideals 
and aims of an accord between France and Germany.  However, the political landscape 
and regional institutions at stake in 1992 were far more mature and complex as compared 
to those of Schumann and Adenauer.  Mazucelli’s history, that begins with the conditions 
predating Maastricht and then covers pre-negotiations, and finally ends with the 
ratification processes in France and Germany, brings to light the challenges, interests, and 
effects of the agreement. By focusing on the two sides of the debate, those of France and 
Germany, as well as recounting the numerous gullies and bridges between them, a clear 
picture of the successful negotiation, in spite of the various challenges, can take shape.9   
“And Still it Moves!” State Interests and Social Forces in  the European Community 
by Linda Cornett and James A. Caporaso appears in Chapter 8 in Governance without 
Government: Order and Change in World Politics, edited by James Rosenau and Ernst-
Otto Czempiel. Cornett and Caporaso, in their paper, deliver a detailed view of the 
history of European integration, from the 1950s to the 1990s, through a lens of both 
economic and political theory. The benefit to Cornett’s and Caporaso’s approach is, just 
as the title suggests, that it very clearly lays out the interests of states and actors in 
Europe, as well as to how they reacted to stimuli in the system, at different points in the 
process of integration. Cornett and Caporaso lay a thick blanket of theory over the 
                                                           
9 Colette Mazucelli, France and Germany at Maastricht: Politics and Negotiations to Create the European 
Union (New York: Routledge, 2009).  




historical narrative. It seems that their insights could be especially useful as policy 
makers consider contemporary actors and member states in Europe, and how they might 
react and respond when exposed to different pressures.10   
Reflecting on the overall phenomenon of unification in Europe still inspires reams 
literature and validates idealistic proponents of cooperation and peace. It is a living 
tribute to the idea that even the most intransigent political squabbles are temporal, and 
that suspicion and selfishness are not the most prudent paths to security and prosperity. 
This paper will not resolve the age-old issue of whether cooperation or competition are 
the best approaches to international relations.  However, it will draw on the above 
sources, as well as various other works of historical and theoretical literature, in order to 
glean lessons of the past and decant guidelines for today’s policy makers who seek to 
preserve the European Union.   
 
  
                                                           
10 Linda Cornett and James A. Caporaso, “ ”And Still It Moves!” State Interests and Social Forces in the 
European Community,” in Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, ed. 
James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (New York: Cambridge University, 1992).  




Chapter 3: Theoretical Analysis 
Analysis and application of theory to various historical scenarios, and the three cases of 
this paper in particular, are critical if we can hope to learn what past experience says 
about contemporary policy making. In my research, I noticed a beautiful and expedient 
symmetry with regard to my cases and their theoretical underpinnings. There are three 
dominant theories of international relations that correspond rather eloquently with respect 
to each of our three cases.   Moreover, three paradigms of integration theory also 
correspond to these cases: The Treaty of Paris (1951) establishing the ECSC, the Treaty 
of Rome (1957) establishing the EEC, and the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) establishing 
the European Union.       
Theories of international relations 
Integration, coordination of interests and competition, as phenomena that describe the 
dynamic relationships between states and governments, can be viewed through the lenses 
of the main schools of international relations theory. Most relevant for this thesis are the 
perspectives of Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism.  Each of these three paradigms 
adds to the understanding of integration in the three cases.  
The Realist school best describes how states relate to each other in an environment of 
anarchy, in the absence of competent or effective global government.  In order to survive, 
states and their leaders are required to always act selfishly, since power and security in 
the international community is essentially a zero-sum game. A state that compromises 
through an alliance with another state surrenders some sovereignty in return for an 
equally realized gain. Since there are only absolute gains in this system, a state must 




benefit disproportionately to all others with respect to any international agreement, if they 
are to realize any advantage.  Otherwise, its security and prospects are inherently 
diminished.11   It should be noted that “balance of power” is also a dynamic aspect of 
Realist theory, as competing states seek stability through matching each other’s 
capabilities.12  Although a Realist perspective might rule out the possibility of equitable 
integration, considering this angle helps explain how inherently skeptical leaders can 
form a trade-off with other states if it is to their advantage.  
The Realist perspective is most beneficial for framing the European environment in the 
inherently uncertain security situation of the 1940s and 1950s. At this time, the embers of 
the bygone Second World War were still smoldering, economic recovery was still in its 
infancy, and vast populations across the continent were still living under occupation, 
rationing and other policies of scarcity.  Furthermore, the Cold War was coming into 
view, casting a long shadow of uncertainty over the international system. Mistrust and 
suspicion ruled the day, as vast security and economic alliances set West against East.   
The Liberal school of political theory is often seen as a direct foil to Realism, as it 
generally assumes the same anarchic system and therefore the selfish motivations of 
states.    However, Liberal thinkers believe that the international system represents a 
positive-sum game as opposed to the zero-sum game of the Realist school. According to 
Liberals, although states in the international system always act purely out of self-interest, 
they can indeed cooperate in certain configurations to transcend the uncertainty of 
competition.   This means that it is possible for two states to align interests in such a way 
                                                           
11 Jack Donnelly, “Realism,” in Theories of International Relations (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2009), page 39. 
12 Ibid., page 37. 




that they both come out ahead, with each party objectively gaining in power and prestige 
from the agreement, though perhaps not equally. In such an arrangement, a self-interested 
state is only seeking gains that are relative to its partners and rivals, and not absolutely 
with respect to the system.  Naturally, Liberal thinkers play an important role in 
integration theory, since Liberalism explains the ways that states can appropriately 
coordinate and join together in order to achieve optimal outcomes for the system and 
benefit all parties.  A strict Realist, by contrast, might insist that there is no possible 
outcome to cooperation in which all states will benefit. From the Realist’s perspective, 
any realized gains must be directly accounted for by deficiencies from at least one state in 
the agreement.    
The ECSC of 1951 was a rigid agreement that cemented cooperation among member 
states in very specific realms.    However, I believe that my second case, the Treaty of 
Rome (1957), as well as the ultimate institutionalization of its European Economic 
Community, is symbolic of the triumph of collaborative Liberalism over cold suspicious 
Realism in the region. It was in the era of 1960s and 1970s, when the EEC emerged, that 
the European community seemed to find its stride, leveraging its combined cultural and 
economic influence to secure and increase prosperity in the face of the Cold War. During 
this era, the “economic community” not only increased its membership, but also further 
integrated cultural and civil institutions in order to enhance the European common 
identity, and not just their checkbooks. The EEC era represents, to me, the power of 
institutionalized collaboration, and therefore a response to Realism.    
One final school of political theory that will be of use when considering the history of 
successful European integration is Constructivism. The Constructivist perspective is not 




so concerned with the inherently anarchic system that drives the analysis of Realism and 
Liberalism.  Instead, Constructivists are concerned with the rules that govern society, as 
well as their fundamentally fluid nature. Regimes change, say the Constructivists, as do 
the tendencies and behavior of actors that they influence within the international system. 
Constructivism is obviously relevant for the study of European integration.  Accordingly, 
the preexisting norms create the regimes and institutions in the images of people’s 
thoughts and perspectives.13   Successful international integration, such as when citizens 
from disparate European states adopt a common regional identity, leaves a deep and 
reasonably permanent effect on the international system, and therefore necessarily 
assumes evolving norms and regimes. A Constructivist perspective provides the tools to 
observe and analyze the trends that make this change possible. Analyzing our cases 
through a Constructivist lens will shed light on the way that rival European actors 
overcame their competitive instincts and inspired their constituents to embrace 
cooperation.   
I argue that the Constructivist perspective is best applied to our final case, the Treaty of 
Maastricht (1992) establishing the European Union. The formation of the EU represents a 
commitment above and beyond community and sharing. As its name suggests, the EU 
was a step toward “unification,” a paradigm shift that would not only coordinate policies 
and markers across disparate states. Now, the EU would address identities of European 
citizens themselves, challenging age-old notions of borders, allegiance and culture that 
had existed since the birth of the Westphalian Age. Maastricht represents a diplomatic 
                                                           
13 Christian Reus-Smit, “Constructivism,” in Theories of International Relations (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009), page 212. 
 




milestone in which Europeans were encouraged to change the way that they view 
themselves and each other, an impossibility without an unconventional perception of the 
international system and an open mind. Such an approach calls for Constructivist thought.   
Theories of integration 
In addition to the three major paradigms mentioned above, the phenomenon of 
integration lends itself to theoretical analysis, according to various schools. Three 
particular perspectives will help frame the process and interests of European states as 
they pursued a path of cooperation in lieu of competition. In contrast with Realism, 
Liberalism and Constructivism, the theories of integration as elucidated below seem to be 
more empirical in essence. They may help explain how states come to cooperate with one 
another, though perhaps to varying degrees of relevance in each case.    
The first theoretical paradigm of political integration, and the one that perhaps played the 
greatest role in influencing the initial catalyst to successful European integration, is the 
school of Functionalism. Functionalists believe that states will be able to find common 
ground with other states for cooperation and integration if they share a common problem, 
called a function. When they see eye-to-eye with respect to a certain function, and find 
that they can procure a solution to it through joining together, the process of integration is 
under way.14 The functionalist approach encourages and predicts that competitive actors 
might embrace their mutual weaknesses, and work together to achieve an optimal 
possibility frontier, a seemingly Liberal notion. However, functionalists are also 
sometimes seen as great pessimists, since the only path to peace and cooperation is 
                                                           
14 Harrison, page 28. 




through a universal integration. Our first case, the 1951 Treaty of Paris establishing the 
European Coal and Steel Community, was very much influenced by Functionalist 
thinkers.   
The second school of integration theory is known as Neofunctionalism. Neofunctionalists 
stress the importance of the integration process on the meaningful and effective 
intergovernmental institutions that are formed through international negotiation. The 
focus is less on the specific issues and problems facing the actors, as well as their mutual 
solution. Instead, the institutions created through the initial engagement and ensuing 
agreement are of prime importance, specifically as to the degree that they have achieved 
prestige and permanence in the eyes of the constituent populace. For Neofunctionalists, 
successful integration occurs where there has been a Functional spillover from the 
original mandate of the institution. Seemingly due to its supranational nature, the 
institution has achieved a runaway degree of prestige in the eyes of the people, who now 
look to it and similar programs to resolve assorted disputes or implement cultural, 
commercial or economic norms.  Neofunctionalists, in order to affect integration, look for 
well-established, popular institutions that provide an alternative channel for citizens to 
engage in cross-border communication and compromises without the direct intervention 
of their respective governments.15  Our second case, the 1957 Treaty of Rome 
establishing the European Economic Community, seems in many respects a paradigmatic 
validation of Neofunctionalist theory as regional actors embraced supranational 
institutions.   
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Key to the success of integration, according to nearly every perspective, is the concept of 
spillover. Spillover refers to the way that one political, cultural or economic arena 
inspires another. Very broadly speaking, when one arena, or regime, that has been the 
target of integration gains the necessary momentum to inspire the mutual cooperation and 
solution seeking of additional problems (according to Functionalists) or the expansion of 
supranational institutions, “take-off” has been achieved.  Take-off is a vital component of 
any effective political integration movement, and it has been observed to great effect in 
all three cases to be studied in this thesis.   
One last perspective on integration is Federalism. Federalists are less concerned about the 
process that leads competitive actors to cooperate so much as they are concerned with the 
quality and impact of sovereign federal institutions independent of sovereign regional 
institutions.16  A Federalist observing European integration might be most interested in 
the proper construction and implementation of supranational regimes in order to 
effectively mollify competing constituent states. Powerful federal institutions influence 
constituent actors and citizens, and themselves become objects of study within the 
regional system. My third case, the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht establishing the European 
Union is in many ways a product of Federalist theory, as Europeans consider integration, 
and grapple with dissolution and reorganization of national identities. 
Testing for success 
My hypothesis is that successful regional integration in Europe, however gradual, was not 
a spontaneous reaction to acute external pressures.  Instead, I argue that successful 
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regional integration was the result of a shared vision and careful planning by policy 
makers and negotiators, who never shied away from addressing lofty ideals even as they 
attempted to resolve practical considerations.   
Based on my research of critics and observers witnessing European integration in the 20th 
century, I have compiled a list of six distinct criteria that must be fulfilled if an 
international agreement will lead to lasting regional integration. These criteria address all 
manner of issues that negotiators consider or ignore as they craft an agreement: short-
term and long-term; practical and idealistic; mundane and lofty.  This “test” will be 
useful for illustrating how exactly these three cases represent instances of successful 
integration, and how exactly other attempts at policy coordination fell short in this 
pursuit.  Finally, I argue that any diplomatic accord that seeks to resolve any outstanding 
regional conflict or further European unification must necessarily account for these six 
criteria, or else risk disappointment. In summation, these six criteria are a means of 
measuring how each case and treaty conforms to integration theory.   
A. Creativity: A successful treaty is necessarily creative as it proposes a settlement in 
complicated and sensitive negotiations. When the negotiating parties are sincere 
about improving the status quo and achieving a more beneficial situation, policy 
makers should be able to provide a vision for not just a better outcome with respect to 
the conventional arrangement, but an especially different one. When the negotiations 
stall and parties grow frustrated, a creative negotiator will suggest never-before 
considered alternatives, shedding a new light on a possible final agreement. Most 




importantly, exciting, novel solutions breathe new life into a summit when 
negotiations seem to have grown stagnant, or worse, hopeless.17   
B. Prescience: Visionary leaders should steer negotiations in the direction of trends and 
institutions that will serve a final agreement well in the years to come. Successful 
negotiations that result in lasting agreements are necessarily well-equipped to endure 
through uncertain future circumstances.18   
C. Responsiveness:  A visionary leader is aware of the geopolitical neighborhood in 
which negotiating parties reside, both internationally and at home. Such leaders are 
conscious of their reputations, and keep their eyes and ears open in order to work with 
and address the interests of non-state groups with a stake in the final agreement.19  
D. Perspective: Visionary leaders negotiating successful agreements have a sharp sense 
of perspective. In a negotiation, they favor the long-game, opting for absolute gains 
over relative ones.20   
E. Forward-thinking: Another characteristic of successful deal makers in regional 
integration is that they give in to strong institutions. This enables them to borrow 
from the future to politically finance today, in order to get a deal done.21      
F. Big picture: Finally, successful integration agreements give special consideration to 
the fallout and payoffs beyond the immediate geographic scope of the negotiations. In 
a bilateral negotiation, they account for the larger regional implications. In a regional 
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summit, they direct an eye toward the global opportunities that may result from a 
lasting agreement in order to build consensus among members.22   
As mentioned, I will reference directly the articles and preambles of the agreements to 
demonstrate what about my cases make them examples for successful integration.  
Additionally, I will draw upon documents, speeches and essays that have been passed 
down to us from visionary leaders and negotiators at these agreements that speak to their 
application with respect to these six criteria.   
Using this multi-faceted approach, I will provide a complete picture as to the elements 
that comprise successful and long-lasting integration agreements. Proficiency in systems 
theory, integration theory and these academic criteria provide a solid three-legged table 
on which to base future policy coordination and regional unification.  
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Chapter 4:  
Case #1: The Treaty of Paris (1951) Establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community 
In the spring of 1951, European civilization was in a very different place than it is today, 
particularly with respect to economic and political life. Although there were a number of 
nascent intergovernmental institutions in operation, each with the aim of strengthening 
cooperation and prosperity throughout what could be called Western Europe, these bodies 
were not exclusively of Europeans by Europeans.  Instead, they seemed to be mainly 
directed by foreign or global parties that were acting upon the region of Western Europe, 
still very much a society licking its wounds from the complete social breakdown of the 
Second World War.  However, this sad state of affairs underwent a subtle yet 
fundamental evolution, when representatives of six European states signed the Treaty of 
Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).  The treaty was an 
accord within Europe and for Europe that not only eased the region’s recovery, but also 
set the underpinnings for a strong intergovernmental organization that would one day 
leverage regional unity to influence international markets and global policy.   
Before the 1951 Treaty of Paris, which established the ECSC, there were a number of 
international institutions already in place since the end of the WWII, to make sure that 
European states worked together with the international community to align interests and 
rebuild a devastated society.   The backdrop of the Cold War provided major external 
impetuses in the formation of these organizations, and for forcing European states to 




cooperate with each other and the West.23  The end of World War II saw the international 
community led by two new-comer states (perhaps, at extreme ends of “the West,”) 
ascend to opposite poles in a new bipolar system.  The European continent, a main World 
War II theater, was located directly between the two superpowers as the infamous “Iron 
Curtain.”  The Soviet Union, from the east, tried to extend their influence and power 
westward through Europe, while the United States, from the west, countered communism 
to promote their own brand of democracy and values.24  Each superpower provided 
material support to protect and promote the security, economic and political assets that 
they deemed vital.  International organizations were one tool at the disposal of the United 
States that provided an opportunity to indirectly influence European affairs.  
With the threat of Soviet invasion ever-present, security considerations were among the 
first European interests to be whipped into line by an international institution during the 
Cold War.  The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was organized in 1948 to provide a 
common defense in the West against the Soviet Union.  NATO was and is a decidedly 
intergovernmental organization, respectful of member state sovereignty, and not 
assuming any supranational institutions in itself.  By 1951, it consisted of twelve 
democratic member states from North America and northern and western Europe 
(notably excluding “Germany,” the site of the east-west Cold War fault line).    
According to the founding treaty, NATO proposes to safeguard democratic principles, as 
well as each member state.  An attack on one NATO member is to be considered an 
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attack on all, and obligates every member in each other’s defense.25  Most notably, this 
principle sends a signal to the international community that the United States, the 
dominating member of the NATO security alliance, would be ready to intervene in 
Europe if a member state seemed vulnerable to Soviet takeover.     
On the political front, the most important international organization in the world in 1951 
was the United Nations.  The UN General Assembly was and is a political body founded 
on the principles of basic human rights and dignity that welcomes all member states to 
the table as political equals.  In its early years, it was a response to the moral devastation 
and humanitarian destruction wrought by World War II26, and in this sense attempted to 
indirectly address the root crises that led to the war, many of which were to be found in 
Europe.  However, as a globally-minded organization, it could not adequately address the 
needs of Europe, nor could it provide an environment that fused the interest of European 
countries vis-à-vis the rest of the world. A global body such as the UN could also be 
susceptible to powerful actors from outside Europe attempting to influence internal 
European alliances and regional politics.  
On the economic front, the most significant international organization in Europe by 1951 
was the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC).  OEEC was a body 
established by European states in 1948 to help enable the appropriate allocation and 
distribution of funds provided through the Marshall Plan.  The Marshall Plan consisted of 
American aid provided to European states, possessions and colonies to rebuild Europe 
after WWII and stave off the spread of communism and Soviet influence.27  Additionally, 
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it promoted economic stability through supporting American exports and lowering trade 
and currency barriers.28 However, by working very closely with the United States and 
Canada in the early years, as well as ultimately welcoming them into OEEC ranks (when 
they evolved in to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), OEEC 
more closely resembled an international organization rather than a regional one.29   
One last European organization that bears mentioning is the Council of Europe, most 
notable for the very general nature of its mission.  Founded by European states in 1949 
with the stated aim of increasing “unity” and safeguarding “ideas and principles,”30 the 
treaty evokes separate states working together to promote regional interests.  However, 
very little is actually stated regarding the specifics of such interests, or the actual duties 
and responsibilities of the Council with respect to European society.  By the early 1950s, 
the Council of Europe seems to have provided a symbolic measure of coordination and 
consideration between member states, rather than an actual engine of policy.   
It is in this challenging environment, of severely weakened European countries clinging 
to their national identities, that the seeds of meaningful European integration were 
conceived.  Europeans were desperate to reconstruct their societies from the ashes of the 
war, yet instead of making war on each other, they were now plagued by external 
political meddling and lingering economic upheaval.  Before long, a few visionary 
leaders stepped forward to shine a light on a real possibility for integration: The European 
Coal and Steel Community.  This bold plan brought a new political course within reach, 
implementing regional unification on a scale that had previously seemed elusive.  In the 
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ECSC, particularly realized through the commitment and vision of French and German 
leaders, Europe embraced efficiency and common institutions while finally blunting the 
appetite for hostile nationalistic competition over borders and markets.   
The European Coal and Steel Community: the beginnings of integration 
In April 1951, six states in Europe, most notably the ancient enemies of France and 
Germany (plus Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg), signed the Treaty of 
Paris, pledging to form a common market with respect to the coal and steel industries.  In 
addition to finding the consensus points for breaking down economic barriers between 
the nations, it also established a number of organs to cement these measures in place.   
There was an intergovernmental Council of Ministers, a professional advisory panel, an 
assembly of delegates from each member state, a judiciary to settle disputes, and most 
notably a supranational High Authority that acted as a secretariat in executing the policies 
of the ECSC.  Among the responsibilities enumerated in the treaty, the agreement tasked 
the High Authority with stabilizing prices and standards throughout the market with 
respect to coal and steel, improving working conditions, eliminating inter-ECSC tariffs 
and duties, and coordinating commercial relationships with third parties.31   
In time, the community had mixed success in its immediate mission of “contributing to 
economic expansion” and the “rational distribution of production” through the unification 
of coal and steel, but its real legacy was in the lasting impression it made on the footprint 
of regional political machinery by establishing a “European ambiance and presence”.32  
Before long, the ECSC was deemed popular enough that the community grew both 
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horizontally (in membership) and vertically (in scope).  Within a decade of its execution, 
more European states lobbied to accede to the agreement, and these member states 
pursued furthering the fences of this community in order to encompass additional 
economic and cultural frontiers.  The success of this unification could be attributed to the 
fact that it provided for true regional integration.  
The miracle of the ECSC, a firmly embedded regional organization in Europe, was no 
accident.  It was the result of a close-knit group of visionaries leading European countries 
through the turbulent post-war period.  In fact, the very summit that led to the negotiation 
of the ECSC can be traced to a 1950 address by French foreign minister Robert 
Schumann, which came to be known as the Schumann Declaration.      The Schumann 
Declaration had two additional parents aside from its namesake: the famous French 
statesman Jean Monnet and German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who embraced the 
ideas of the declaration. 
The declaration brazenly proposed nothing short of world peace, an aim that could be 
achieved through European unification, specifically via a Franco-German union.  Given 
the fact that France and Germany had been at war for hundreds of years, and only five 
years prior had wrapped up the bloodiest conflict in world history, the plan could have 
only sounded crazy enough to work.  “Any action taken,” wrote Schumann, “must in the 
first place concern these two countries.”  Although France and Germany had been 
historic enemies, any organic European union that did not include them both was doomed 
to fail.  Schumann explicitly called for a bilateral coal and steel community.  These two 
industries represented fuel and weapons, the very bread and butter of war-making.  At the 
same time, they were critical for infrastructure building, manufacturing and foreign trade.  




Combining French and German coal and steel production, stated Schumann, would 
eliminate economic competition and jealousy, encourage cooperation and demilitarize the 
seeds of armament.33      
Schumann, Monnet and their team were well positioned to suggest surrendering 
sovereign authority over French coal and steel production and extending an olive branch 
to Adenauer, despite France’s complicated history with Germany.  For one thing, France 
was facing a potential economic crisis, due to an imbalance in the amount of coal and 
steel being produced (Urwin 44).   French leadership, based on a number of international 
reports, was convinced that regional coordination of resource production and allocation 
was the only way to rebuild the local economy.   For another, France saw that West 
Germany was already showing signs of strong economic and industrial recovery.  
Convincing the as yet vulnerable Germans to join a regional partnership would provide 
the still dominant French with an opportunity to monitor and influence German recovery 
better than the cumbersome international monitors that had been in place since the end of 
the war.   Finally, in a common market, France could gain access to cheap German 
industrial production, specifically steel.34  Also of note, the international crisis of the 
Korean War brought additional demand to the market for European steel.   
From Adenauer’s perspective, joining a limited union with the rival French also provided 
selfish benefits for West Germany.  As stated above, it allowed for more local 
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supervision over the German industrial recovery and resource production, together with 
the French, instead of foreign and multinational monitors such as the International Ruhr 
Authority imposed by the Allied victors.   In essence, it repositioned Germans to reclaim 
their own sovereignty over such capabilities, albeit shared with their French neighbors.  
Additionally, Germans’ accepting of the French overtures of peace, and committing 
themselves to cooperate in a united European society, could help restore their goodwill 
and trust with the international community.  Ultimately, with this goodwill in hand, 
Germans could hope that the sanctions imposed by the Allies might one day be removed 
completely.35        
While Schumann seems to have been influenced by political and economic realities in 
proposing his vision for the ECSC, his advisor Jean Monnet was a fierce integrationist 
who in time came to be known as the “father of Europe.”36  Monnet was a member of the 
Functionalist school of integration theory, which believed that specific needs known as 
“functions” were where distinct interest groups could find common ground and achieve 
integration.37  Where two distinct interest groups share a need, they can also share a 
solution.  Through focusing on their Functional similarities, rivals can team-up to solve 
problems together through joint institutions, ultimately affecting the way that they see 
each other and inspiring further spillover integration.  Functionalists like Monnet 
believed that regional integration was a stepping stone to universal integration.38          
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In 1962, Monnet looked back on the Schumann Declaration of 1950.  With regard to the 
looming economic and industrial crises in Europe, Monnet wrote that “the resources of a 
single nation were not sufficient.” France and Germany’s problems “were no longer 
solely of national concern, but were mutual European responsibilities.”   Brokering the 
ECSC, in Monnet’s perception, “was a technical step, but its new procedures, under 
“common institutions,” created a silent revolution in men’s minds.39  Common 
institutions are the key to integration according to students of Functionalism and 
Neofunctionalism.  They are engines that create what scholars call “spillover,” defined as 
the point when cooperation in one specific area becomes normative, and inspires further 
cooperation in other sectors.  The key to affecting the behavior of nations was to 
influence their inherently selfish nature.  And the way to appeal to that nature was 
through a gradual “chain reaction” initially set off by a Functionalist approach and such 
institutions.40  
Testing the ECSC 
The ECSC agreement, in achieving a degree of significant economic unification between 
Germany and France, also laid the foundations for a political bridge across the historic 
chasm that separated the two nations.   For centuries, these two states, and frequently 
their neighbors, could not agree on anything.  To the contrary, they grasped for every 
opportunity to antagonize each other.  Limitless amounts of blood was spilled in the 
name of religious, social, and material causes.  As I argue, it was the vision and 
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commitment imbued into the agreement by its key proponents that was behind the 
ECSC’s lasting feasibility.   
Creativity: One aspect in which its fathers’ vision played a role in its success was due to 
the fact that the ECSC proposed a new solution to address an old problem.  The 
immediate objectives facing European policy makers in the late 1940s and early 1950s 
were rebuilding society from the devastation of WWII and banishing the appetite for 
military conflict (particularly from Germany).  However, the successes of conventional 
attempts at affecting meaningful organic political cooperation were stunted or 
inconclusive.  The OEEC was not equipped to address the long-term objective of a 
European peace41, and the strictly political Council of Europe was little more than a 
symbolic clearinghouse of ideas, lacking any meaningful influence.  With the launching 
of the ECSC, as proposed in the Schumann Declaration, a lasting Franco-German peace, 
and ultimately political coordination, could be achieved through economic and industrial 
cooperation.    Instead of leading with politics to affect economic change, or even 
cynically isolating the realms from one another, the new order envisioned by the fathers 
of the ECSC proposed achieving the relatively modest aim of finding mutually beneficial 
economic common ground as a precursor to political unity. 
Prescience: The ECSC agreement was particularly well-suited to anticipate future trends 
and outlast future pressures.  Schumann and his team, prior to the declaration, wisely 
anticipated the difficulties France and other European nations might face in attempting to 
spur economic development based on existing national capabilities and resources.42   
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Through a common market for coal and steel, not only could the domestic market benefit 
from greater efficiency and economies of scale, but Europe could become a global 
destination for industrial materials.  This return to global power, albeit as a unified entity 
in a limited commercial arena, might have been an unintended consequence of the vision 
of the founding fathers.   
Responsiveness: The Schumann Declaration, laying the groundwork for an ECSC 
agreement, is extraordinary in that it is not addressed to the West German government 
(Schumann’s counterparts) or the French cabinet (Schumann’s constituency), but instead 
to the people of Germany and Europe as much as to France.  Schumann spoke of 
increased standard of living, equal access to material and labor, and of course, enduring 
peace and security.  By addressing the pooling of transnational markets, an agreement for 
a coal and steel community, according to Schumann’s declaration, necessarily appealed 
to civil society and transnational interests.  And of course, the final agreement signed in 
Paris included the necessary institutions to respond to these issues.  The High Authority 
and the ECSC Court of Justice executed supranational policy and mediated disputes.  
Additional organs, like the advisory panel that recruited common professionals from 
across the member states and the Common Assembly gave the European public a seat at 
the table, which was rare for the strictly intergovernmental organizations that 
predominated during the period.  
Perspective:  It is true that in proposing and launching the ECSC, Schumann and his 
colleagues saw the immediate benefits of such an arrangement. Efficient markets for 
France, and prestige for West Germany.  However, the way that the Schumann 
Declaration and final ECSC agreement played the long game was truly visionary.  Until 




this point, some organizations like OEEC or NATO carried out short-term objectives well 
enough with a high degree of political collaboration in the short-term, but did little to aim 
for any long-term goals or effect significant spillover in that they specifically lacked 
supranational institutions. The ECSC, by contrast, created a community that was formed 
along very specific parameters, yet aimed for the long-term.  Because the ECSC asked for 
such a minimal non-threatening commitment from its members (specific industrial 
cooperation for 50 years), it could count on long-term political cooperation and goodwill.   
Forward thinking:  The framers of the ECSC were especially forward thinking, in that the 
agreement is best remembered for the strong institutions that, as we shall see, inspired the 
Treaty of European Economic Community. namely the High Authority and the Court of 
Justice.  Other groups operating in Europe at the time, such as NATO, OEEC and the 
Council of Europe, relied on intergovernmental cooperation instead of asking states to 
defer sovereignty to limited yet independent supranational agencies.  In these other 
organizations, states did not surrender any sovereignty, but they also missed out on any 
opportunity for integration through membership.   
Big picture: Another sign of a visionary agreement is one that addresses not only the 
immediate jurisdiction and member states, but also the surrounding environment.  The 
ECSC meets this criterion in a number of ways.  Most notably, it relieved long-lasting 
belligerent tensions between France and Germany.  Additionally, it showed the super-
power potential of a united Europe, when the ECSC took effect and began to participate 
in international markets and global trade.    
In light of the above analysis, the success of the ECSC cannot be considered a mystery or 
coincidence, but rather a deliberate product of dedicated vision and careful planning.  




Over time, this blueprint helped realize similarly positive results in other regional 
agreements, especially my other cases.    
  





Case #2: The Treaty of Rome (1957) Establishing the European Economic 
Community 
Europe’s experiences under the ECSC influenced the continent’s alliances throughout the 
1950s, and raised questions as to the feasibility of integration in other sectors, specifically 
with regard to the economy, politics and culture.   Various attempts at further integration 
in Europe, inspired by the success of the ECSC consensus, eventually led to my second 
case, the Treaty of Rome 1957 establishing the European Economic Community.   
Shortcomings of the ECSC 
After several years since taking effect, it was soon apparent that the ECSC was in many 
ways less than perfect as an agreement calling for integration, even with respect to its 
narrow mandate of unifying coal and steel markets.  The ECSC had a number of 
problems executing its mission.   It did not succeed in eradicating subsidies across the six 
member states, and community supranational institutions, as established in the 
agreement, were poorly equipped to deal with the ensuing issues when national interests 
prevailed over regional ones.43  In short, ECSC institutions were starkly inadequate from 
a Neofunctionalist perspective, and these inadequacies came to the fore as economic 
pressures mounted.   
Although Functionalism brought the ECSC together, it was not enough to sustain the 
integration movement. A European community of states needed stronger central 
institutions, perhaps a point that was overlooked in 1951 due to the ECSC’s Functionalist 
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pedigree. It also is true that, despite its shortcomings, no members ever threatened to 
leave the agreement.44    In other words, the union was sustained even when it failed in its 
execution of stated aims. This can be seen as a sign of political spillover, as states clung 
to other ideals beyond the coal and steel community in order to justify their commitment.    
As ECSC institutions struggled with execution, member states across the board were 
reluctant to surrender additional sovereignty that might have directly addressed such 
challenges.45  This seems a direct validation of the Functionalist origins of the ECSC, 
since member states were invested in the association through their common functions and 
issues, and not through any supranational organs or regional government. Although the 
aims of the agreement languished, the union itself flourished, and became a fixture of the 
international political landscape.   
The institutionalization of the ECSC, which paved the way for a greater European 
community, stands in sharp contrast with another failed attempt at regional organization 
of the era, the European Defense Community (EDC).  The EDC was a brain-child of the 
1950s that sought to unite European security interests (perhaps through a common army) 
in much the same way that the ECSC united states behind a common market for coal and 
steel.  It was born out of the Functionalist idea that total integration in a region can be 
affected sector by sector.46   
The EDC had a few characteristics in its “DNA” that seemed antithetical to the genesis of 
the ECSC, and perhaps figured into its failure as a regional organization.  Firstly, the 
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EDC was specifically designed to ingratiate certain members to join, namely the UK and 
a rearmed West Germany, whereas the ECSC was an organic initiative of French and 
German leaders, with other states tagging along.  Secondly, an EDC called for non-
equality among members, with some states receiving a greater share of responsibility and 
power.  Thirdly, the EDC became linked with other non-regional international 
organizations, such as NATO. While the ECSC was an independent organization that 
sought to influence international and regional markets on its own terms, the EDC was 
conceived in the context that it would support NATO’s operations at home and abroad.  
In 1952, Adenauer anticipated a fundamental challenge to an EDC that precedes even 
logistical considerations: That a common European army must necessarily assume a 
common European foreign policy.47  In other words, some critical level of political 
unification must precede security unification.   
Although the debate opened a political rift between France and Germany, years of 
political wrangling around an EDC led to the birth of the Western European Union. It 
may have represented a step backwards from regional integration in that it strengthened 
national armies, supported the international NATO, and relegated social and cultural 
concerns to an outside organization, the Council of Europe.48   
Despite the failure of idealistic attempts at integration such as the EDC, which called for 
ambitious attempts at sweeping fundamental integration, the ECSC was poised to provide 
a platform for meaningful change.  Unlike an EDC which sought an uneven distribution 
of power among members in spite of an extremely sensitive mandate, the ECSC enjoyed 
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a total consensus among member states, despite its limited political scope and ranks.  
Additionally, it had existing supranational institutions that carried viability and credibility 
with member governments that could be used as a springboard for “political community” 
beyond coal and steel integration.49  This factor in the ultimate formation of the European 
Economic Community is a validation of Neofunctionalism, how supranational institutions 
themselves can affect integration.   
In 1955, in Messina, Functionalism took the spotlight one last time as ECSC leaders met 
to discuss coordination of a common nuclear policy. The nuclear issue was a fortuitous 
function for the community to address, following coal and steel, since it proved 
extremely attainable and non-controversial. In contrast with some other possible sectors 
of integration, such as transportation or agriculture, there were very few industrial groups 
in civil society in 1955 who were directly involved with nuclear industries. This meant 
that the governments could negotiate at face-value, without having to bargain with trade-
unions, political parties or other transnational interest groups. The nuclear issue was 
basically a one-level game.  Secondly, a coordinated nuclear policy could provide 
member states with a cheap and attractive source of energy for their rapidly 
industrializing and growing economies.50  That same year, the Messina conference 
directly authorized the formation of a supranational ECSC committee to explore the 
possibility for further integration in Europe, to be led by Belgian statesman Paul Henri 
Spaak.  Spaak also searched for additional opportunities for integration in the commercial 
realms, above and beyond coal, steel and nuclear power. 
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The Spaak Report framed technical considerations for what a common market and other 
integrated commercial interests in Europe could look like.  In 1957, the six ECSC nations 
signed the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community, which 
encompassed the original ECSC.  Concurrently, the same six nations also formed a 
separate entity (under a separate treaty) called EURATOM, which coordinated the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy.   
The Spaak Report and the Treaty      
The Spaak Committee had a rather narrow mandate to explore and ascertain specific 
instances for a common European market, and this mission is reflected in the very 
extensive and technical language of the report.  However, underneath the tariff rates and 
percentage points lies a foundation that gives away an agenda of building Neofunctional 
consensus. For example, the Spaak Report recommends that states in a common market 
should share the windfall in a particular sector, so that one member will not benefit at the 
expense of another. It calls for a European Commission, a supranational institution to 
broker between strong and weaker members, especially when parties are sensitive to 
certain membership considerations. The Spaak Report calls for a gradual accession to 
common market standards, in order to accommodate vulnerable states. In the event that 
one state is struggling to meet the standards and commitments of membership, the 
European Commission may afford extensions and assistance.  One final consideration 
that stands out in Spaak’s language is a respect for other supranational commitments, 
such as GATT.  All of these factors point to a desire to strengthen supranational 
institutions, and for member states to look to a powerful central body and internal 




procedures for settling their disputes, instead of through confrontation with other 
members.51  
As if there were any doubt as to the motivations of the ECSC six when formulating the 
European Economic Community, based solely on the text of the Spaak Report, the 
preamble to the Treaty of Rome removes all of it. Not only does it clearly state the 
political intentions behind this seemingly technical and commercial accord, but it also 
invites other European states to join the movement. The preamble references 
“foundations of an ever-closer union,” “progress,” “steady expansion,” “solidarity” as per 
the political nature of the United Nations, and explicitly calls to “the other peoples of 
Europe who share the ideal.”  In fact, an equal amount of text in the preamble is accorded 
to the political and idealistic objectives of the agreement as to the commercial ones:   
DETERMINED to establish the foundations of an ever closer union among 
the European peoples, 
DECIDED to ensure the economic and social progress of their countries 
by common action in eliminating the barriers which divide Europe, 
DIRECTING their efforts to the essential purpose of constantly improving 
the living and working conditions of their peoples, 
RECOGNISING that the removal of existing obstacles calls for concerted 
action in order to guarantee a steady expansion, a balanced trade and fair 
competition, 
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ANXIOUS to strengthen the unity of their economies and to ensure their 
harmonious development by reducing the differences existing between the 
various regions and by mitigating the backwardness of the less favoured, 
DESIROUS of contributing by means of a common commercial policy to 
the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade, 
INTENDING to confirm the solidarity which binds Europe and overseas 
countries, and desiring to ensure the development of their prosperity, in 
accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, 
RESOLVED to strengthen the safeguards of peace and liberty by 
establishing this combination of resources, and calling upon the other 
peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts…52 
The European Economic Community, as put forth in the Treaty, establishes a number of 
organs to fulfill its mission of coordinating economic policy, establishing a common 
market and promoting political unification across Europe:   
 A Parliament to advise and supervise (equivalent to the Assembly of the ECSC) 
appointed by member governments;53 
 A Council of Ministers to make decisions and coordinate policy; 54 
 A European Commission, totally independent of member governments, to execute 
the Treaty;55 
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 A Court of Justice to interpret the Treaty, and hear cases between member states 
and between the Commission and member states;56 
 And an Economic and Social Committee.57 
The Economic and Social Committee was comprised of professionals from member 
states from various economic, industrial and social backgrounds.  It enjoyed advisory 
status, and specifically included sub committees for transportation and agriculture (as per 
the treaty).  In other words, the European Economic Community was a strict economic 
agreement, with spillover specifically built into its institutions.58   
A number of articles throughout the document bear mentioning as to the wisdom behind 
the agreement, precisely what may have helped the EEC achieve renown among scholars 
as a “model of peaceful change.”59   
For example, article 73 of the Treaty of Rome paints a picture of the European 
Commission as a single administration for three separate communities: The European 
Coal and Steel Community; The European Economic Community; and Euratom, the 
aforementioned nuclear agreement also signed in Rome.60   In this way, the Treaty seems 
to paradoxically encourage unification through acknowledgment of diversity It doesn’t 
blend the separate spheres, it only brings them into an umbrella arrangement. 
Article 75 builds high walls around the issues of national security. The agreement 
respects national security, privacy and arms trading deals in each member state.States that 
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join the European Community need not worry about having to disclose or renege on these 
sensitive deals. In the case of a conflict, the European Commission may broker a 
solution.  
Articles 224-226 are what I call articles of flexibility. These articles provide guidance and 
call for flexibility in order to keep the Community functioning, even though black swan 
events may rear their heads in certain member states. Such events might consist of 
political turmoil or economic pressures.  
 Article 240 differs considerably from a principle established in Paris in 1951. The article 
states that the Treaty will be in force for an unlimited time, in contrast with the ECSC 
which was only a 50 year commitment.61  This forever clause indicates how leaders at the 
Rome summit met with their eyes toward changing the map for future generations.   
Testing the EEC 
The Treaty of Rome signed by the six states of the ECSC laid the foundation for lasting 
policy coordination in Europe, by taking a turn toward the Neofunctionalist, in 
comparison with my first case.   
Creativity: Similar to the way that the ECSC represented a backlash of pragmatism to 
foreign meddling and vapid idealism that constituted other inadequate international 
organizations, the formulation of the EEC was also conceived in an environment of failed 
attempts at political integration. The disappointment of the EDC debacle (having given 
way to an ineffectual WEU) sent ECSC leaders reexamining their own hyper-pragmatic 
functionalist roots. While steeped in practical discussions around integrating the nuclear 
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sector, ECSC parties were inspired to reach for political unification by dusting off and 
repolishing their existing supranational institutions, namely the High Authority 
(inspiration for the “European Commission” in the EEC) and the Court of Justice. 
European leaders at Messina discovered the way forward by reviving a path that was long 
left for dead.  In this, they also breathed new life into the movement for political 
unification in the region.   
Prescience: In the preamble, the EEC’s signatories state their ultimate political aims of  
permanent European unification and peace.  However, the treaty does not stop at 
describing the responsibilities of member states to the agreement with respect to 
achieving these idealistic aims. Instead, it spends a considerable amount of text regarding 
flexibility for states in crisis and mediating disputes between states themselves (through a 
supranational commission) and between states at the periphery and the core (through 
broad powers granted to the commission and through a judiciary).  These aspects made 
the treaty immediately attractive not only to the six signatories in Rome, but also to all 
states in the region, be they large or small or rich or poor. The treaty, even in 1957 before 
any sweeping revisions (which would be made over the decades), was a sincere effort at 
inclusion, and envisioned a future where a greater diversity of states could be party to the 
agreement.  
Responsiveness: The framers of the Treaty of Rome were very conscious of how the 
agreement might be accepted and challenged when in effect, and learned from the lessons 
of other failed attempts at integration. One example that comes to mind is how the Treaty 
specifically excludes jealously guarded defense-related issues from its purview. 
Additionally, it encourages member states to appeal to its supranational institutions, 




namely the European Commission, instead of each other in the event of a difference of 
interpretation.  Finally, its establishment of an official advisory Economic and Social 
Committee specifically gives a voice to civilians across Europe who are not necessarily 
enfranchised through the political establishment, yet represented broad transnational 
interests. As Haas suggested, this committee provides a unique opportunity for policy 
makers to understand and influence citizens on a supranational level.   
Perspective: Once again, this refers to the way that although treaty framers explicitly 
reached for the lofty, they asked only for concrete commercial commitments from 
members, in a practical timeline.   
Forward-thinking: The Treaty of Rome was made possible by preexisting supranational 
institutions held over from the ECSC. By recognizing their importance and by 
strengthening these institutions, the European Community could now interface and 
cultivate relationships directly with other states, including those in the region not yet a 
party to the treaty. This Neofunctionalist consideration played an important role in 
helping the community expand over the years. 
Big picture: The common market of the EEC brought drastic changes within the region. It 
affected lives by guaranteeing property, movement, employment and tariffs across 
member states. In a real sense, it forged a solid political block out of the region, and 
increased the prestige and negotiating power of that block. Although policy expansion 
and integration in the community slowed during the 1970s,62 membership grew 
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substantially and the dreams of Rome’s preamble would inspire a new generation to seek 
unification on an even grander scale in the 1980s.   
As I suggested, the formation of the EEC represented both a turn toward 
Neofunctionalism (as further integration was based on central Functionalist institutions 
carried over from the ECSC agreement), but this deepening of the political bond between 
European states also represents a victory for Liberalist theory. With the greater degree of 
cooperation and the calls for “unity and “solidarity” of the Rome Treaty’s preamble, in 
addition to the deliberate spillover as engineered through the formation of the Economic 
and Social Committee and subcommittees, the “original six” appeared more optimistic 
about the prospects of long-term integration, and less apprehensive about empowering 
their neighbors through mutual collaboration.  Additionally, the way that the treaty 
invited other states in the region to join the movement, as well as the fact that it was only 
a few years before other major European powers began to consider accession, is also an 
indication as to the warmer climate in the region towards cooperation instead of 
suspicion.   
This new Liberal outlook and eventual normative shifts that took hold in the region 
would, over the next few decades, pave the way for a Constructivist leadership to arise in 
Europe, which would build on the EEC’s achievements to establish an even bigger and 
more powerful regional organization.   
  





Case #3: The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) Establishing the European Union 
Sometime in the decades that followed the Treaty of Rome and the establishment of the 
EEC, the idea of regional unification in Europe became a part of the political landscape, 
an institutional norm driving the community of states toward a formal union.  During this 
process, the community as a distinct political entity expanded greatly in membership 
numbers and prestige.  By the 1990s, even the most enthusiastic anti-Federalist member 
state in the EEC, the United Kingdom, accepted unification as a foregone conclusion.  In 
this manner, the Treaty of Maastricht on European Union was unanimously signed by all 
member states in 1992.   
The family of Europe grows 
Since the late 1950s, when the ECSC was metamorphosing into the EEC, the new 
regional bloc had caught the attention of other European states.  The United Kingdom 
and the Scandinavian countries had anticipated the growing economic bargaining power 
of the EEC, and formally established an European Free Trade Agreement in 1960 to 
protect the markets of regional states who did not wish to join the Community.  
Specifically in the case of the UK, interests lay with balancing against the new Franco-
German axis, nurturing a close relationship with the United States (instead of aligning 
with the EEC), and taking advantage of preferential commercial agreements with the 
Commonwealth and the Sterling zone.  However, as the decade wore on, British 
influence on the world stage and with the United States waned, as did London’s authority 
to dictate preferential terms to the Commonwealth.  Faced with the prospect of being left 




behind by an increasingly powerful European community of states, applying for 
admission to the bloc grew more attractive.  In fact, trade within the EEC had been 
doubling in size, and by 1961 represented the “world’s largest trading power.”63 Two 
separate applications for accession to the EEC were submitted by the UK during the 
1960s, as London risked being isolated on the world stage, on the outside looking in at a 
happy EEC family.   
In 1962 and 1967, the UK and other EFTA states with close ties to the British economy 
applied for membership in the EEC.  Both of these applications were vetoed by a wary 
President De Gaulle of France, who feared that the UK represented an American “Trojan 
horse” and possibly also because he resented British power and prestige as a threat to 
France.64  As the UK bids were shot down, the other states that had hoped for 
membership due to their geographic and economic ties to the UK (Norway, Ireland and 
Denmark) also withdrew their applications.   By 1970, however, Charles De Gaulle had 
left office, leaving in his stead a more agreeable French representation.  Additionally, 
Britain had been feeling more pressure to join the community than ever,65 and offered the 
European Community (EC), as the EEC was known since 1967, its most favorable terms 
yet for accession.  In January 1973, the bid was formally accepted, as were those of 
Denmark and Ireland.  Norway had their bid accepted, but failed to ratify the Treaty of 
Rome at the domestic level, and declined membership.  But the EC had its prize: The 
third leg of the major European economies counted among its ranks.  Additionally, by 
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welcoming new states for the first time, the community realized an important milestone 
on the road to long-term regional unification.   
Although other states had applied for EEC/EC membership at a steady clip since 1958 
(when Israel’s application for accession was rejected, presumably on geographic grounds, 
soon followed by Greece and Turkey), the accession of the UK, Denmark and Ireland 
were the only full members admitted until the 1980s.   However, as Community 
bargaining power and prestige increased even during years of global economic turmoil, 
other countries in Western Europe came to lobby for membership.  These states included 
Portugal, Spain, Greece, Turkey and even some EFTA states that were afraid of being 
locked out of a united Europe.      
Steps toward supranationalism 
In 1965, the European Commission, the independent body of the EEC charged with 
administering the Treaty, officially absorbed Euratom and the ECSC, formally taking 
over responsibilities for those agreements as well (though Euratom exists as a treaty apart 
from the EEC agreement).  Although the intergovernmental European Council 
(composed of appointed national representatives) had long used its supreme authority to 
check the power of supranational institutions such as the Commission, 1973’s Hague 
Conference empowered the federal institutions as never before.66  The Commission was 
granted greater access to tax revenues and greater responsibilities, while the European 
Parliament was given more control over the EC budget.  However, intergovernmental 
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wrangling over a number of economic and commercial initiatives stalled further political 
unification.  
Despite the difficulties in executing of its objectives, as before, no member state ever 
threatened to leave the community.   States parties remained bound to the community, 
committed to the long-term goal of European unification.  Without having yet realized 
concrete objectives as envisioned in the EEC agreement, the members’ commitments 
reflect a Federalist devotion, as the community took on a political life of its own.   
Signs of political unification 
Although they struggled to unite internally, EC states succeeded in many respects in 
presenting a united front to the outside world.  For one thing, the 1967 rebranding from a 
European Economic Community to a more general European Community is a clue as to 
the the long-held vision of states parties’ desire to strive for broader unification.  By 
1983, the EC as an independent unit had signed 30 agreements with more than 100 
countries.67  Additionally, there were external factors at play that helped shape, on some 
minimal level, a common European foreign policy.  By necessity, the EC had a common 
policy toward the Commonwealth, the oil shocks and Arab nationalism helped shape 
policy towards MENA, and the fraying of the Iron Curtain in the 1980s encouraged 
policy formulation with respect to Eastern Europe for the first time.68  In the public 
sphere, EC representatives spoke for the community of constituent states at several 
international summits, including the United Nations General Assembly, and EEC 
ambassadors began to meet at regular, frequent intervals to discuss foreign policy and 
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agenda coordination.   On the security front, with the fading of Soviet power, European 
interests began to diverge with NATO, driving even neutral European states to consider 
joining the EEC, and a revitalized WEU provided a convenient bridge to coordinate 
strategy with NATO.69    Although there was no coordinated EC foreign policy in 
anything but the most obtuse issues, it could also be said that member states were not 
disinclined to discuss or seek common ground in international relations.70  Time and time 
again, this open minded-ness seemed to keep states involved in the union and invested in 
its future, even when policy coordination seemed to falter.   
The decade of the 1980s saw an endless series of reports and conferences aimed at 
moving along political integration in Europe, as leaders seemed determined to tackle the 
ultimate objective of the Schumann Declaration, issued years before.  Each report and 
conference attempted to address potential conflicts and pitfalls.  Some proposals, such as 
Spinelli’s Draft Treaty for a European Union (1984) reached for an idealistic, polished 
organization of states.  Others, such as the Dooge Report and the Milan Conference 
(1985-6), considered practical policy issues and prerequisites for integration.  All of these 
summit meetings and research, absent of actual action, are perhaps an indication of 
patience from “unification” advocates within the EC ranks as they accommodated 
recalcitrant states (led by the UK and Premier Margaret Thatcher) opposed to unification.  
But by the end of the decade, even dissenting states that supported intergovernmentalism 
against a rising tide of supranationalism refused to consider leaving the community.71          
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As Federalist thought established itself among European leaders, the movement for 
integration took on a new momentum.  In 1985, a few EC states signed the Shengen 
Agreement, which effectively sought to dissolve borders between states (though 
implementation proved difficult, and is still controversial).  In 1986, the EC countries 
signed the Single European Act, which set a clear road map for regional integration 
toward a political union of European states.  In addition to officially rebranding the EC as 
“the European Communities,” the SEA also called for a common market by 1992, which 
was largely a consensus issue even at the fringes of the EC.  Although this development 
was hardly controversial, it was extremely significant in that it was specifically blessed 
by the European Council.  This gave the Commission and the Court, two federal bodies, 
effective authority over domestic courts on certain domestic issues.72  It was a self-
imposed step toward supranationalism by member states.  With the ball in the court of the 
EC institutions, 1992 took on the feeling of an inevitability more than a target.73   
In the run-up to 1992, the Federalist Jacques Delors became the President of the 
European Commission.   He worked to implement the SEA and also three additional 
items for a 1992 Maastricht conference that would go beyond simple economic 
unification: A European monetary union; a social agreement on labor standards and 
human rights; and a budget.  He faced fierce opposition from the UK and Thatcher, who 
favored expansion of the community over deeper integration, and disagreed with some 
social components of Delors’s agenda.  However, even though Thatcher embodied the 
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very opposition to unification, even she acknowledged in 1988 the Federalist norm and 
was in every respect “pro-EU:” 
I am the first to say that on many great issues the countries of Europe 
should try to speak with a single voice.  I want to see us work more closely 
on things that we can do better together than alone.  Europe is stronger 
when we do so, whether it be in trade, in defense or in relations with the 
rest of the world.  74 
Delors, in a response to Thatcher the following year, discussed the importance of 
Federalism for the future of the European Communities.  He described how his European 
union would require sovereignty while respecting pluralism and subsidiarity.  This is 
because Federalism, claimed Delors, in addition to espousing the importance of powerful 
central/regional institutions (to govern citizens at the most efficient level), also preserves 
national/local traditions and identities.  In a conventional anarchic system, when states 
are locked in competition, they are forever trying to subjugate and conquer each other, 
with the aim of unifying the region under a single national and cultural banner.  In a 
Federalist system, by contrast, national boundaries and cultural backgrounds are 
respected and imbued with formal legitimacy, protected and enshrined within the larger 
community.75   
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However, uniting Europe was more than a practical matter for Delors.  It also hearkened 
back to the dreams and destiny of Europeans.  He acknowledged and emphasized that 
necessity had finally brought European states together and the imperative that states take 
advantage of this opportune moment in history to realize their destiny.  Building a bridge 
to Schumann and Monnet, Delors echoed the Functionalism that inspired the ECSC 
founding fathers, by referencing the common challenges facing the members of the 
European Communities.  Only further Federalist coordination could provide the solution 
to those challenges.   
How are we to find a solution except by strengthening the federalist 
features of the Community…?  How are we to shoulder our international 
responsibilities and at the same time pave the way for the emergence of a 
greater Europe, except by pressing ahead with European integration?  
Only a strong, self- confident Community, a Community which is united 
and determined, can truly hope to control that process. 76 
Finally, with a nod to Constructivism, Delors ends his speech by challenging the 
Community to “make a telling contribution to the next phase of our history.”77  People 
should not fear national dissolution or bureaucratic paralysis from surrendering 
sovereignty to a regional government.  This is the way that European states will be 
expected to meet their challenges in the future decades, and it is mechanically sound, 
though perhaps difficult to envision.   
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By the time the European Communities got to Maastricht in 1992, a “Treaty on European 
Union” seemed all but inevitable, especially with a less combative British cabinet 
following Thatcher’s exit.  After its signing, ratification in member states proved 
controversial at the domestic level, and a final version included numerous revisions 
listing several state-specific exemptions and opt-outs.  However, it was Federalist 
thinking that pulled the negotiations together over the years, and throughout the ups and 
downs of ratification, no member state ever threatened to leave the union.  The EU has 
remained an institution ever since.   In the words of German Chancellor Helmut Kohl in 
the run up to 1992, Maastricht “was crossing the Rubicon.  There is no going back.”78  
The Treaty 
Despite the reams of state-specific exemptions, exceptions and revisions in the treaty, the 
preamble and subsequent items speak to the purpose and the vision of the Maastricht 
summit.  Although Maastricht and the EU built on previous economic agreements, the 
preamble implies that the organization is built on the ideals of political unification, civic 
involvement and human rights.  Firstly, it formally inaugurates “a new stage in the 
process of European integration undertaken with the establishment of the European 
Communities,” seemingly jettisoning the “economic” label, once and for all.  Next, it 
affirms the importance of “ending the division of the European continent” and expressed 
the desire for “deepen[ing] solidarity between peoples,” while respecting their cultural 
heritage.79  
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After laying the foundation of idealism underpinning the formation of the EU, the 
preamble gets down to brass tacks, explaining through what methods it will unite the 
continent and preserve its culture.   A first item referring to the EU machinery calls for a 
single, federal institutional framework to “enhance further democratic and efficient 
functioning of institutions.”  A financial item proposes a monetary union under “a single 
and stable currency”  to streamline and unite members’ economies.   A commercial item 
calls for a common internal market spilling over into coordinated environmental policy, 
followed by an item proposing a formal EU citizenship for residents (in addition to 
national citizenship).  The EU also proposes the formation of a common defense and 
security policy “thereby reinforcing the European identity and its independence,” as well 
as a Shengen-like agreement facilitating the movement of people across the integrated 
landscape.   Finally, the preamble closes with a commitment by EU institutions to govern 
directly over EU citizens, sharing sovereignty with the local national governments.  This 
last statement in the preamble charts a direct course away from intergovernmentalism, 
and leaves national leaders with a strong commitment to supranationalism.80   Following 
the preamble, the former EEC is officially referred to as “the European Community” in 
the remainder of the treaty.81   
Testing the EU 
In many respects, with the norm of European Federalism firmly in place, the Treaty of 
Maastricht seems as much an affirmation by the region to pursue unification as a 
commitment to further economic integration.  Since its implementation was largely 
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economic (though its mandate was very political), my criteria fit the actual text of the 
treaty only loosely. With this in mind, I suggest that Maastricht provided inspiration to 
other EU agreements that are in many way more functional though less foundational.  For 
example, the implementation and expansion of the Shengen agreement over the years 
impacted society in a real way by allowing Europeans to travel across the continent under 
a single passport.  Another example is the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) that provided for a 
more reorganized and more democratic (and less intergovernmental) political process at 
the federal level.   
Creativity:  Although the mechanics of the treaty were hashed out and then revised over 
the years, the originality shines through in the Constructivist vision presented by Jacques 
Delors.82 Delors advocated a Community that would be accountable, sovereign, effective 
and a sum of Europe’s disparate parts.  He acknowledged that realizing such a vision 
called for reimagining the political world he and his contemporaries inherited, and 
crafting a new one for themselves.  The real originality lay in the way that the EU and 
future members would collectively impact the international system, in the new political 
model that they constructed at Maastricht.   
Prescience:  Maastricht was prescient in that it included frameworks for practical 
progress in the short term (for achieving realistic objectives), but also approached long-
term idealistic objectives.  Because of the Federalistic enthusiasm, even among skeptical 
states, Maastricht as a whole could be focused on the future far more than other 
agreements. 
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Responsiveness:  In my opinion, this is the most inspiring attribute of the Maastricht 
process.  For more than ten years, serious challenges and doubts were expressed about 
unification, particularly from the corner of the expansionists and intergovernmentalists.  
Yet policy makers lent an ear to the skeptics, and either waited for more favorable 
political conditions before moving forward or revised whole sections of the agreement in 
order to win members’ approvals.   In earlier treaties, this extreme flexibility might have 
proven a liability, but in an era when European Federalism dominated as a norm, 
integrationist leaders wisely used this wiggle room to make sure that an EU umbrella 
could satisfy all its members.   
Perspective:  The road to Maastricht was very long, spanning not only years, but also 
incorporating a number of preliminary summits and reports.  Even following the signing 
of the accord, ratification across member states proved an ordeal in and of itself, facing 
ferocious competition in national capitals.  Treaty framers were able to draw on the 
hundreds of pages of reports, recommendations and deliberations to craft an agreement 
that would keep the Community moving forward, even incrementally.  With Federalism 
as the established norm, and other European states from EFTA and the Iron Curtain 
lobbying for membership, they were able to make accommodations to 
intergovernmentalists with the realization that time was on their side.  Judging by the 
number of EU agreements in the wake of Maastricht, they were proved right.      
Forward-thinking:  In line with its originality, Maastricht was a first step toward a 
politically unified region that changed the way that Europeans engaged with other parts 
of the world. Powerful institutions across the common market made Europe a desirable 
destination not only for states in the region not of the EU, but also for people seeking a 




better life around the world.  Additionally, the common currency as proposed by the 
agreement, although ambitious, gave the world’s largest trading bloc a powerful financial 
tool with which to move markets. 
Big picture:  Once again, the prevailing Federalist rhythm of European political life made 
Maastricht most notable, in my opinion, for getting member states to sign on the dotted 
line.  It is true that it called for sweeping reforms and expansion of supranational 
institutions, but most importantly it reinforced itself and the EU as the consensus center 
of European political life.  In its final form, it gave up much of its Federalist character in 
exchange for accommodations to signatories.  But it laid a groundwork for future 
agreements, increased the political and economic prestige of the Community on the 
international level, and inspired other nations across Europe to apply for accession and 
“join the movement,” fulfilling an ideal put forth in the Treaty of Rome 35 years earlier.   
By the time that Maastricht was signed in 1992, Constructivist influence permeated EC 
thinking, especially through the commission president Jacques Delors.  Constructivism as 
a theory depends on societal norms and identity of the actor, as individuals and societies 
possess the potential to shape their own environments, as opposed to being shaped almost 
entirely by external forces, as per rational theories such as Realism and Liberalism. In the 
latter two paradigms, actors must base their desires and strategies on previous 
experiences and interests.  However, Constructivist thinkers recognize social dynamics to 
identify changing norms.  To the Constructivist, tomorrow’s world is not bound by the 
social limitations of today.  New organization of politics and cooperation are always 
possible.  Imagining all Europeans as citizens with common rights, privileges and 
identities, as well as reconstructing the roles of individual nation state. 





Chapter 7: Conclusion 
What does the future hold? 
As the generation that successfully founded modern European integration fades away, 
regional unity is in the hands of new leaders who face severe challenges. A few of the 
major crises that have recently confronted EU states, and stoked division in Brussels, 
include both external and internal pressures. For example, the Euro crisis, brought to the 
fore by the global financial meltdown of the last decade, has tested Europe’s political 
mettle, as members squabble over how to best implement fiscal stability across the union. 
Additionally, the free movement of humans across the EU, from migrant laborers to 
Syrian refugees, present logistical threats to the stability of the community.  Finally, 
Islamic terrorism strikes at the physical security and sustainability of European society 
inside and out, as transnational militias from the Middle East export ideology, materiel 
and soldiers, and those soldiers are often enlisted from among Europe’s own 
disenfranchised nationals. All of these major pain points, as well as numerous other 
issues, are the subjects of fevered debate between regional leaders, as member states 
struggle to coordinate their corresponding national policies. In many ways, cultural 
identities across the continent, national fears and aspirations alike, have been exaggerated 
by these crises.   
Assuming that European states resolve their differences peacefully, how will the outcome 
impact the integration movement in Europe? Will the EU evolve by taking on greater 
sovereignty at the federal level, binding the community tighter than ever before, as it did 




in the Treaties of Paris and Rome? Or will it maintain the union by mollifying unhappy 
members that seek to reclaim or protect sovereignty at the state level, as it did in the 
aftermath of Maastricht? Both of these would be acts of preservation for EU leaders. 
There is also a third unlikely possibility, in which unhappy states leave the union 
altogether in order to pursue their own national interests and policies.     
If history is any guide, EU members will find a way to arrive at a consensus with a mind 
to resolving these crises. The previous 60 years have seen governments rise and fall and 
policy regimes come and go.  However, the European Union has only flourished, with 
more states joining and more agreements affirming greater sovereignty at the federal 
level. All the while, no member state has ever left the union and abandoned the dream of 
integration, even as it bickered with its peers or wavered in its compliance with EU 
policies. Margaret Thatcher, the British leader who personified the opposition to federal 
sovereignty in the EC, described the new Europe as a “family of nations,”83 evoking an 
imagery of states bound together by a heritage thicker than water. In a biological and 
social family, non-conformity and even non-compliance do not necessarily lead to 
expulsion or defection. Perhaps this is so for political blood-relations as well, and part of 
what Lady Thatcher wanted to convey through this allusion.      
Resolving the economic crisis with integration theory 
My thesis has presented the significant impacts of the theories of Functionalism, 
Neofunctionalism and Federalism on regional integration, and the ways that they inspired 
European states to pursue cooperation instead of competition.  However, what theory of 
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integration will provide the inspiration for European leaders to navigate the rapids 
currently threatening peace and stability in the EU?  Will one of these three theories 
figure prominently over another, or will some other as yet unidentified paradigm present 
itself? 
It is possible that the current political climate is still heavily influenced by Federalism.  
The importance for global financial markets of European economic integration, and 
preservation of the common currency, is well established. The EU is still the world's 
largest market,84 and one can imagine the numerous difficulties for both the union and a 
defector state in stabilizing their markets should one decide to break away.   Additionally, 
with the Euro currency playing such an important role in capital markets, at times 
appearing to rival even the almighty U.S. Dollar, a state in the European Monetary Union 
leaving the agreement is, in my estimation, hardly more than a very compelling thought 
experiment.  On a political level, Europe is also bound rather tightly, though subtly. 
States parties fly the EU flag outside their diplomatic missions abroad.  Furthermore, on 
many occasions, the EU negotiates or mediates political agreements and peace treaties, 
reflecting a very broad common foreign policy among member states toward certain 
situations.85  Additionally, EU agreements over the last ten years, most recently the 
Treaty of Lisbon, have put more political sovereignty into the hands of supranational 
organs, namely the directly elected European Parliament.  Finally, the cultural, 
transportation and commercial standards that are found throughout the EU will not be 
easy to  unravel overnight, should an angry member state choose to defect. In  my 
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opinion, these are all symptomatic of a powerful Federalist influence that continues to 
prevail. States will stick with the EU because it is a powerful, important institution in 
itself, sacred in its own right. The reality of an integrated Europe is too powerful a norm 
to defy, and national interests must conform to accommodate compliance.   
Perhaps a Neofunctionalist approach will help move the EU forward in the near future, 
through the power wielded by supranational institutions. In this instance, a state 
considering defection, or threatening to do so, might risk direct competition with the full 
economic and political might of the region. Even nations in other parts of the globe, 
which owe their health and prosperity to Europe's robust markets and commercial girth, 
might steer clear of a defector. In some cases, Europe's supranational institutions actually 
possess enough sovereignty to retaliate against a defector state, such as the extremely 
influential European Central Bank and other regimes. In other words, even a state that is 
unhappy or alienated from its peers in the EU will still opt to affirm its commitment to 
membership, due to a Neofunctionalist need to settle its disputes in sovereign 
supranational institutions.   
It is also possible that the cycle of paradigms will come full circle, and see a return to 
Functionalism to sustain regional integration, as it was during the era of Schumann and 
Adenauer. States quarrelling over various matters of policy at the federal level, such as 
with regards to bailout terms or other commercial benchmarks, might be able to overlook 
political hotspots because they realize that coordination and cooperation is necessary. 
Frustrated states would stay in the union, but not simply because of they are worried 
about what the international community might think of them, nor because they fear the 
EUs institutional power. If influenced by Functionalism, they will just accept that 




compromise is worth the cost of membership, since teaming up with other nations in the 
region happens to be functionally effective. 
Addressing the free movement and resettlement issues using the six criteria 
My hypothesis is that successful regional integration in Europe, however gradual, was not 
a spontaneous reaction to acute external pressures.   Instead, it was the result of a shared 
vision and clever planning by policy makers and negotiators, who never shied away from 
addressing lofty ideals even as they attempted to resolve practical considerations. This 
careful and sensitive balance that the founding fathers of the EU were able to strike, from 
Schumann to Spaak to Delors and beyond, provided just the necessary formula to 
convince states to surrender some of their jealously guarded sovereignty.  As I argued, 
the consensus agreements that they helped forge fulfilled a lengthy set of criteria, in 
accordance with integration theory. If Europe’s leaders expect to be successful in 
stewarding the integration movement toward a politically united continent, and 
weathering the current storm of crises, I strongly suggest they abide by the same 
guidelines.    
For example, in the case of resolving the crises around the movement and resettlement of 
people within the EU, an agreement should be:  
Creative: Negotiators in Brussels could review the various disagreements and debates 
around this issue, and identify the exact points where policy interests diverge. At these 
cruxes, they should concentrate on suggesting original proposals that would either bridge 
the gap directly between the disagreeing parties (such as an effective compromise) or 
take the issue in a new direction entirely. As to the latter, parties need to recognize that 




divergent interests in one specific policy area do not presuppose disagreements in 
another.   
Prescience: Any successful agreement among member states should have considerations 
or mechanisms built in, to anticipate and resist future pressures.A deal done only for 
today might not last through tomorrow.   
Responsiveness: Negotiators will be obliged to consider the reputations of themselves 
and their constituencies as they hash out an effective agreement.  Additionally, they must 
consider the concerns and vulnerabilities of those who will be indirectly affected by the 
agreement and account for those interests as well.  
Perspective: When negotiating parties reach an impasse, they can consider building in 
stronger (or weaker) shared institutions down the road in order to coax concessions today 
from an insecure party.   
Forward-thinking: A successfully negotiated settlement to maintain momentum towards 
regional integration would not just focus on the immediate policy matter. It must also 
utilize the language of idealism and reference the ultimate goal, as a legal witness to 
remind states parties why they are cooperating in the first place. This will also provide 
inspiration for future agreements. 
Big picture: Any effective agreement will carefully consider opportunities and threats 
beyond the immediate scope and geographical reach of the states parties. Considering 
only the regional impact while ignoring the global effects would leave the agreement 
vulnerable to unexpected attacks.   
Seeking a common security policy to combat terrorism 




Terrorism, as perpetrated around the world by groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS, presents a 
difficult challenge for polities like the EU and the United States. One reason is because of 
the fluid and transnational nature of these armed groups’ members and organizations.   
Frustratingly, ideology seems like the most critical export of these terrorist groups, a 
commodity that is not so easily controlled by commercial regulation and border 
agreements. In many instances, the terrorists themselves are homegrown citizens of the 
targeted EU states. As a result, there is no military operation, bombing campaign or 
sanctions regime that will neutralize the modern terrorist threat overseas. An effective 
policy must be by parts unconventional and original, so that it addresses the ideological 
and societal roots of the conflict in addition to carrying the threat of coercive force.   
The EU is not a regular government, and does not have a sophisticated foreign policy or 
particular defense/security apparatus shared among its member states. For the most part, 
every EU member represents itself in security and defense matters. Coincidentally, 
terrorism is not a regular security threat, and transnational terrorist groups are themselves 
not regular armies or governments that can easily be targeted by policy campaigns. 
Perhaps this uncomfortable symmetry would provide just the opportunity for member 
states to formulate a consensus of foreign and security policy for the EU, at least with 
respect to the Al-Qaeda and ISIS threats. The way in which the EU is a political 
organization that spills over national borders and exerts a magnificent amount of 
influence and power in global affairs might seem similar to the way that terrorist groups 
do the same. Perhaps the secret to countering transnational but regionally focused groups 
like Al-Qaeda and ISIS is through similarly amorphous, yet powerful and united, polities 
like the EU.      




Though Europe is currently facing a number of serious crises, today’s leaders would do 
well to remember the lessons of the last few decades, especially the one that meaningful 
integration cannot be rushed or conceived out of thin air. As I demonstrated, every single 
one of my cases was preceded by years of trial, error and extensive deliberation. 
European Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker recently remarked, in response to 
the need for EU members to absorb Syrian refugees, “There is not enough Europe in this 
union,” and “We have to change this now.”  At the time of Juncker’s remarks, leaders of 
Germany and France, the two core states of European integration, were reported as being 
on board with the Commission’s assessment.  “We need to change,” said German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel.  “And it won’t help to point fingers.”86  Whether or not 
Europe can continue along the path to integration is, as we have seen in the run-up to my 
three cases, independent of how member states adopt a common policy at the domestic 
level. Instead, it is more about how inspired leaders embrace the vision of a united 
European identity through shifting norms and patient negotiating. As long as Europeans 
can trust each other for the long-run, history shows that policy-differences have little 
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